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Closure, (M,R) systems, analytic model,
relational model, synthetic modelAbstract Robert Rosen’s central theorem states that organisms
are fundamentally different to machines, mainly because they are
‘‘closed with respect to effcient causation.’’ The proof for this
theorem rests on two crucial assumptions. The first is that for a
certain class of systems (‘‘mechanisms’’) analytic modeling is the
inverse of synthetic modeling. The second is that aspects of
machines can be modeled using relational models and that these
relational models are themselves refined by at least one analytic
model. We show that both assumptions are unjustified. We
conclude that these results cast serious doubts on the validity






--Computation in various forms has become a well-established part of the methodological spectrum
in biological sciences. One aspect of this is the development of powerful database systems to store
and efficiently retrieve vast amounts of experimental data. Computers are also increasingly used as
modeling tools. Systems biologists [9, 10], for example, design detailed computational simulations of
biochemical systems; at the moment these simulations are mostly confined to individual pathways,
but the ultimate goal of the field is simulations of entire cells. Systems biology is not the first or only
approach to modeling life in computers. Another field is artificial life (see for example [1, 19, 12]).
Artificial life has its roots in computer science rather than biology. Accordingly its aim tends to be
towards general underlying principles of organisms, with less emphasis on the detailed understanding
of the chemical processes that go on within particular life forms.
Many aspects of organisms are very well modeled by and as computational processes [4, 3]. This
does not necessarily mean that organisms as a whole are well described as or modeled by compu-
tational systems. In fact, the experience of research into artificial life seems to be (at least so far) that
there is no useful abstraction of life that can be implemented as a computer program; the problem
is not so much the lack of computational power as a lack of conceptual understanding of what
precisely makes a system come alive [2, 8].
So far, these suggested limitations are only impressions, intuitions, or conjectures. Fact is that
at the moment there is no convincing example of an implementation of a living system in silico;
neither are there hard arguments to show why life cannot be modeled as a computational process.
Yet one attempt to provide such arguments is a body of work by the late mathematical biologistArtificial Life 13: 1–13 (2007)
Q1Computational Realizations of Living SystemsD. Chu and W. K. HoRobert Rosen. In his 1991 book Life itself (LI) [21] Rosen presents an argument that living systems
are fundamentally different to machines, in particular Turing machines; this result is often referred to
as Rosen’s central theorem. The proof is based on an analysis of various types of models and their power
to describe classes of systems. An outline of the argument itself will be presented further below
in Section 3.3; for the moment we will only introduce the most important concepts necessary to
understand the central theorem.1no
 There are three types of models: analytic, synthetic, and relational. The last are essentially block
diagrams summarizing high-level properties of systems. An example of a (simple) relational
model is provided below (see Figure 2 in Section 3.2). Analytic and synthetic models will be
defined in Section 2.
 Rosen defines a class of systems he calls mechanisms. We will not go into the details of the
definition, but state two of the crucial properties of mechanisms: Firstly, in mechanisms






if N is a mechanism, any mode of analysis whatsoever is equivalent to a process of
anti-synthesis. Stated another way: in a mechanism, analysis coincides with anti-synthesis.
[21, p. 212] l aRosen refers to this property as fractionability. Secondly every mechanisminot
 fhas a unique largest model Mmax.[ . . . ] Epistemologically this model contains everything





n A particularly important class of mechanisms are machines. Turing machines are members
of this class.
 Rosen then constructs a minimal relational model of an organism [sometimes called
(M,R)-system]. He observes that this model exhibits a property that he called ‘‘closure with
respect to efficient causation.’’ Loosely this means that all components of the system are
created and repaired by other processes in the system.
 The final step is to show that systems that are closed with respect to efficient causation
(i.e., in particular living systems) are not compatible with the idea of mechanism; they
belong to a more general class of systems [16, 17]. He also shows that computational
systems can at best be partial models of living systems. This is the central theorem.Au
thDespite LI being first published in 1991, there is renewed interest in Rosen’s work. Recent pub-
lications extending Rosen’s work include Letelier and coworkers [14, 15], Wolkenhauer [25], and
Casti [6, 5], to name but a few. Yet there are also a number of critical publications. Specifically one
should mention Wells [23], who documents inconsistencies in Rosen’s writings. Landauer and
Bellman [11] point out mathematical errors in LI. Using a number of examples, they show that
central parts of LI (in particular the minimal model of an organism) are mathematically questionable.
While certainly illuminating, their approach is vulnerable to the objection that they simply chose the
wrong examples to make their point. Chu and Ho [7] also looked at Rosen’s minimal model of an
organism. They argue that the entire concept of ‘‘relational modelling’’ that underlies Rosen’s centralhe reader should note that the discussion in this article assumes some familiarity with Rosen’s work. In addition to the original
ature there exist a number of comprehensive reviews of Rosen’s ideas [16, 17, 25, 22]; the reader who would like to familiarize
self with Rosen’s work is encouraged to consult these.
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theorem is inconsistently used by Rosen himself. The problem with Chu and Ho’s article is that their
treatment remains largely conceptual and lacks mathematical rigor.
Despite more or less clearly stated criticisms, all of the above authors seem to agree that Rosen’s
research program in theoretical biology is worthwhile to pursue. Yet, before his (or a similar) research
program can be continued, it is necessary to understand whether or not Rosen’s results (in particular
the central theorem) hold. If the central theorem were indeed correct, this would have very wide
implications on our understanding of living systems. However, in the present article we will show that
Rosen’s proof does not stand up to scrutiny.
This article is organized as follows. The next Section 2 defines analytic and synthetic models
and derives a theorem describing the relation between these two models. The conclusion of that
section will be that for finite systems analysis and anti-synthesis are never equivalent, thus con-
tradicting a central tenet of Rosen’s. This is followed by a discussion Section 3. Section 3.1 discusses
the connection between analytic and synthetic models on the one hand and direct sums and
products on the other. This section is not strictly required for the overall conclusion of this article;
it was included anyway because direct products and sums feature prominently in Rosen’s own
discussion. Section 3.2 will show that even in the realm of mechanisms relational models cannot be
extracted from supposedly largest analytic models. In Section 3.3 Rosen’s proof of the central
theorem will be briefly outlined. This outline will clearly show that the proof is based on false
premises, namely that for mechanisms (i) analysis and anti-synthesis are equivalent and (ii) there is
a largest analytic model that contains everything knowable about the system. Finally, Section 4









in2 Analytic and Synthetic Models
In this section we will define the notions of analytic and synthetic models; the objective is to do so as
they were introduced by Rosen [21, 20]; furthermore, this section will provide some insight into the
relationship between these two types of models, as they are relevant for the understanding of the
central argument. This will culminate in the formulation of Theorem 1.
2.1 Analytic Models
We begin by defining analytic models (cf. [21, Chap. 6C]).
DEFINITION 1: Let f be a mapping from a finite set S to some set U. An analytic model M(S) of the system S
is the set of equivalence classes on S induced by f. We say that two elements x, y a S are equivalent and write xff
y if f(x) ¼ f( y). The equivalence class of x on S induced by f is denoted by [x]f and is a subset of S. We denote by
Ma(S) the set of all analytic models of S.
Remark 1. The set S represents the system to be modeled and can be thought of as the set of
states the system can take (for a more in depth discussion of this assumption see [7, Section 2.2]).
If S is a natural system, then it is usually unknown; note that we assume here that S has a finite
number of elements; this assumption will simplify the analysis to follow but, as it will turn out, will
not affect our overall conclusions. The system can be probed via meters that indicate values of
observables; in Definition 1, the observable is the function f, and the measurement results are
elements of the set U.
We will henceforth indicate the fact that the model M(S ) is generated by the observable f by
writing M f(S ), or simply M f. Given a specific system S, there typically exist a great number of
different analytic models. Models can sometimes be compared with one another with respect to their
degree of refinement, that is, the degree to which they differentiate between elements of S. Such
models are called compatible. Two models may also describe unrelated properties of a system, in which
case they cannot be compared and are incompatible.Artificial Life Volume 13, Number 4 3
Computational Realizations of Living SystemsD. Chu and W. K. HoDEFINITION 2: Given the analytic models M f and Mg, we say M f and Mg are compatible if either of the
following conditions is true: 8x a S [x]f p [x]g,














If there is no clear containment relation between the equivalence classes induced by one model
and the other, then we say that these models are incompatible. Some equivalence classes of M f might
contain (or be contained in) equivalence classes of Mg, but if Mg and M f are incompatible, then there
must be at least one equivalence class of one model that has nonempty intersections with at least two
equivalence classes of the other. This is expressed in the following definition.
DEFINITION 3: Given analytic models M f and M g, we say M f is incompatible with Mg if ax, y, z a S s.t.
x ff y, y fg z , y kf z , and x kg y.
It is easy to show that incompatibility is a symmetric relation, as it should be.
PROPOSITION 1: Incompatibility is a symmetric relation.
Proof. M g is incompatible with M f if ax, y, z a S s.t. z p y, x, z fg y, y ff x, y kg x, and z kf y.
Through reordering of the variables in the equivalence relations one obtains the same set of con-
ditions as in Definition 3: y fg z , x ff y, x kg y, and y kf z. This completes the proof.
Whenever two models are incompatible, they are not compatible, and vice versa. We will now
show that this is the case.
PROPOSITION 2: Incompatibility is the negation of compatibility.
Let us first show that M f, Mg compatible implies M f, Mg not incompatible. If M f, Mg are
incompatible, then there exist x, y, z a S such that the following relations are true:
½xf ¼ ½ yf ; ½ yg ¼ ½z g ;
½ yf jj ½z f ; ½xg jj ½ yg ;
where A jj B means that A and B are disjoint sets. This is Definition 3 written in a different form. If Mf,
Mg are compatible, then we are entitled to assume that [N]f p [N]g, for all N a S; this follows directly
from the definition of compatibility. If we assume that Mf and Mg are both compatible and incompatible,
then [ y]fp [ y]g¼ [z ]g. This means that the intersection of [ y]f and [z ]f contains at least the element y, thus
contradicting the condition [ y]f jj [z ]f . Hence if two models are compatible, they are not incompatible.
Let us now show that the opposite direction is also true, that is, that not compatible implies
incompatible, or equivalently that not incompatible implies compatible. If M f,Mg are not compatible,
then (without restricting generality) this means that there is at least one equivalence class Yf of g that
intersects at least two (disjoint) equivalence classes Xf , Zf of f. Choose x a Xf \ (Xf \ Yg ), z a Yg \
(Xf \ Yg ), and y a Xf \ Yg. It is straightforward to show that x, y, z fulfill the definition for
incompatibility. This completes the proof.
There are various degrees of incompatibility. For the current purpose we will be specifically
interested in models that measure completely different aspects of a system in the sense that knowingArtificial Life Volume 13, Number 44
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about one does not tell us anything about the other, not even probabilistically; these models are then
totally incompatible. Formally, total incompatibility means that each equivalence class of M f intersects
each equivalence class induced by Mg. Note that the models M f and Mh in Figure 1 are totally
incompatible.
DEFINITION 4: Given nontrivial analytic models M f and Mg (i.e., both models induce at least two equivalence
classes on S), we say M f is totally incompatible with Mg if 8x a S it is true that 8y a S, S s [x]f \
[ y]g p ;.
Remark 2. Note that a pair of models is always compatible if one of the models is trivial, that is, if
its function is constant and it induces only one equivalence class on S (namely S itself ).
PROPOSITION 3: Total incompatibility implies incompatibility.
Proof. We want to show that if M f, Mg are totally incompatible, then they are incompatible, that is,
there exists a set of x, y, z that fulfills the equivalence relations in Definition 3. We start by choosing












Figure 1. This illustrates the concept of compatibility and incompatibility. The system S is indicated by the thick closed
line. The left hand side shows how the function f partitions S into equivalence classes (in this case into four classes). The
right hand side (top) shows a function g that is compatible with f. Every equivalence class induced by g is contained in an
equivalence class of f. The graph on the bottom right shows a function h that is incompatible with f (it is in fact totally
incompatible).
FPO
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Computational Realizations of Living SystemsD. Chu and W. K. HoChoose a point N a U V. We know that the set U ¼ [x]f \ [N]g is nonempty. Choose an element
y a U. It is now true that x ff y and x kg y. This is the first half of the incompatibility conditions.
To show the second half, choose an element N V a V V where V V ¼ S \ [x]f . Again it is clear that
V V p ;. We also know that the set V ¼ [N V]f \ [ y]g is nonempty. Choose a z a V. For any such z it
will be true that x kf z and y fg z , which completes the proof.
Given that two models are compatible, we can compare them in terms of how well they
distinguish between states of S. Note that such a comparison is not well defined if the two models





DEFINITION 5: Given analytic models M f and M g, we say M f is a refinement of Mg if every equivalence class
corresponding to ff is contained in one equivalence class induced by fg . We use the notation M
f z Mg.
Remark 3. There is a very close relation between refinement and compatibility. In fact, whenever
two models are compatible, there is a refinement relation between them, and whenever there is a
refinement relation between models, they are compatible. The distinction between those two concepts
is twofold: Firstly, there is a subtle difference in meaning of refinement and compatibility. The former
expresses the fact that of two models one is ‘‘better’’ than the other, whereas compatibility only means
that it is meaningful to compare two models in the first place. Secondly, compatibility is a symmetric
relation, whereas refinement is not.
Refinement relations between models introduce a partial order into Ma(S). Hence Ma(S) is a
partially ordered set, or simply poset. In the remainder of this subsection we will explore the structure of







noPROPOSITION 4: The set of all analytic models of S, Ma (S), is a partially ordered set with respect to therefinement relation z.
Proof. Trivial, since such a refinement relation is obviously reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive.
This completes the proof.
Posets are a category in the sense of category theory (see for example [18, 13]). This is of some
interest in the current context, because on posets there is a clear notion of direct products and direct
sums of models (see for example the discussion by Chu and Ho [7]). Rosen himself seems to assign
some significance to this observation, as evidenced by the prominence of the notion in the overall
discussion in [21]. Yet, as will be discussed below (see Section 3.1), in the current context it seems
that there is no fundamental significance to direct products and sums. This thread will therefore not
be followed up any further.
Instead, we will now continue to ask how analytic models are related to one another. We start by
defining the mutual refinement of two models. Even if two models are in no special order relation,
one can combine the incompatible aspects of both to form a new model. This new model will be a
refinement of both.PROPOSITION 5: Let M f and Mg be incompatible analytic models of S with f : Si U and g : S i V. Then
the analytic model MF of S induced by F ¼ ( f, g ) : Si U 	 V is the least mutual refinement of M f and M g. We
will henceforth write MF ¼ M f 
 Mg.
Proof. First let us show that MF is indeed a refinement of M f and Mg: In order to show that MF is a
refinement of M f it is sufficient to show that every equivalence class [x]Fp [x]f . This means that for
all x1, x2 a S it is true that if F(x1) ¼ F(x2) then f (x1) ¼ f (x2). This is trivial from the definition of F.
The analogous argument can be made for g.Artificial Life Volume 13, Number 46
Computational Realizations of Living SystemsD. Chu and W. K. HoNext we need to show that it is indeed the least mutual refinement. Assume MG refines both
f and g. This means that every equivalence class of G is contained in an equivalence class of f and
of g, that is, if G(x) ¼ G( y) then also f (x) ¼ f ( y) and g (x) ¼ g ( y); this however means precisely
that G refines F ¼ ( f, g ). Therefore F is the least mutual refinement of f and g. This completes the
proof.
We know now that given two analytic models, we can always combine them into a refined
model. The next proposition states that it is also true that, given an analytic model (that is not



















then there exist two models M f, Mg aMa(S) that fulfill the following two conditions:
1. M f and Mg are incompatible.
2. MF is the least mutual refinement of both M f and Mg.
Proof. The model MF can be represented by the set of equivalence relations it induces on S; we
assume that S is partitioned by F into several equivalence classes Xk ¼ [xk]F. Two cases can be
distinguished.
The first case is that F induces an uneven number of equivalence classes, that is, S ¼ X1 [
X2 [ : : : [ X2m+1. We can define a new observable by its set of equivalence classes. Choose f, g
to be given by the following:
f W fX1 [Xmþ1;X2 [ Xmþ2;:::;Xm [ X2m;X2mþ1g
g W fX1 [ X2 [ : : : [Xm;Xmþ1 [Xmþ2 [ : : : [ X2mþ1g
By this we mean that the new observable f is obtained from F by merging equivalence classes
respectively. M f and Mg are clearly incompatible. The proof for n ¼ 2m is analogous. This proves the
first part of the proposition.
The second part can be seen as follows: M f can be refined by successively de-merging unions of
Xi; this leads to a series of new models of which only the last one, where all Xi are de-merged, is also
a refinement of Mg. Similarly, one can argue with successive refinements of Mg. In both cases, the
only model that refines both M f and Mg is MF. Hence, MF is the least mutual refinement of both M f
and Mg. This completes the proof.
Without providing a proof, we will also state that an analytic model can only under certain
circumstances be considered the least mutual refinement of two other analytic models.PROPOSITION 7: Models M f, Mg in Proposition 6 are totally incompatible if and only if the number of
equivalence classes induced by F on S is even.
The next proposition states that it is meaningful to say that a model is a minimal refinement of
another model (as opposed to the minimal mutual refinement of a pair of models). In fact, every
model is the minimal refinement of a whole set of other models inMa(S ). We will henceforth refer
to those models as minimally coarsened models of MF.Artificial Life Volume 13, Number 4 7




PROPOSITION 8: If MF is a model and 9x1, x2, . . . , xn a S, n > 2, s.t. 8i, j V n, i p j : [xi]F \ [xj]F ¼
;, then there exist l ¼Pn1i¼1 i models of S such that for each of those models M fi it is true that MF > M fi and
for all MG > M fi it is true that MG z MF. We will henceforth refer to models M fi as the minimally coarsened
models of MF.
Proof. The proposition simply states that every observable that induces more than three equivalence
classes on S can be coarsened in l different ways. This is easy to see: The only way to coarsen an
observable without losing compatibility is to pairwise merge equivalence classes. There are exactly l
ways to merge equivalence classes. This completes the proof.
Thus there are two modes of refinement: mutual refinement between incompatible models, and
refinement of a single model. This latter mode of refinement corresponds to the splitting of equivalence
classes. Correspondingly every model is associated with a number of minimally coarsened models.
These results allow us now to describe the structure of the posetMa(S ) of all analytic models of
S. There exists a maximal modelMmax, that is, 8M aMa(S ) it is true that Mmax zM. This maximal
model corresponds to an observable fmax with the property 8x, y a S, x p y, fmax (x) p fmax ( y).
Furthermore, there is a minimal model Mmin with the property 8x, y a S, x p y, fmin (x) ¼ fmin ( y).
This minimal model is trivial and refined by every model. Finally there is a set of simplest nontrivial
models, of whichMmin is the minimal coarsening. Each of those models partitions S into exactly two









ina2.2 Synthetic ModelsWe will now turn our attention to synthetic models. A synthetic model is essentially the ‘‘union’’ of
two analytic models of disjoint systems. So, for example, if one has two (separate) models of two
(separate) particles, then one can formally merge those two models in one larger model. This new
model would be a model of a larger system encompassing two particles. We will now formulate this
idea more precisely:
DEFINITION 6: Suppose S1 and S2 are (disjoint) systems, functions f1 : S1i U, f2 : S2i Vare not surjective,
and M f1 and M f2 are analytic models of S1 and S2 respectively. Then M
F ¼M f1 PM f2 is a synthetic model of S ¼
S1t S2 (the disjoint union of S1 and S2), where F¼ ( f1¯, f2¯) : SiU	Vand f1¯ : SiU, f2¯ : SiVare as follows:
as follows:
f¯1ðxÞ ¼
f1ðxÞ if x a S1
c1 if x a S2
f¯2ðxÞ ¼
f2ðxÞ if x a S2






8x a S1 : c1 p f1ðxÞ
8x a S2 : c2 p f2ðxÞ
We denote by Ms(S ) the set of all synthetic models of S.
Remark 4. In Definition 6 we require that f1, f2 be not surjective. This requirement does not limit
the generality of the definition, but is necessary in order to ensure that there exist suitable constants
c1, c2. In case f1 or f2 are surjective, it is always possible to extend the sets U and V by one more
element. This would be sufficient for the current definition.Artificial Life Volume 13, Number 48
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This definition immediately leads to a first observation regarding the relation between the vari-
ables that are induced by the new system:
PROPOSITION 9: If MF aMs(S) with M f¯1, M f¯2aMa(S) and MF ¼M f1PM f2, and furthermore F, f¯1, f¯2
are as in Definition 6, then M f¯1, M f¯2 are not are not totally incompatible.
Proof. Assume S ¼ S1 v S2, x1 a S1, and x2 a S2. In order to be totally incompatible all






because S1 and S2 are disjoint. This completes the proof.
Both analytic and synthetic models are associated with activities, namely the analysis and synthesis
of models. Synthesis is simply the merging of two analytic models into a larger analytic model. By
analysis of a model we essentially mean the process of decomposing a model MF into pairs of
models of which it is the mutual refinement, that is, finding models M f, Mg such that MF ¼ M f 

Mg. There are now two questions we want to ask. Firstly, under which circumstances are analytic
models synthetic models, that is, when is an analytic model of the form MF ¼ M f1 P M f2? The
answer to this, as it will turn out is that they always are. The second question we want to ask is:
Under which circumstances are synthesis and analysis simply inverse processes?
DEFINITION 7: We say that analysis and synthesis of S are inverse if for all analytic models MF aMa(S) and
all pairs of models M f1, M f2 with MF ¼ M f1 
 M f2 there exists a set S1o S s.t. 8x, y a S1 we have f2(x) ¼
f2( y) and furthermore 8x, y a S\S1 we have f1(x) ¼ f1( y).
Remark 5. Compare Definition 7 with Definition 6 of synthetic models. The essence of this def-
inition is that we can only think of a pair of models M f1, M f2 as splitting S into two parts if f1 and
f2 are constant on complementary parts of S.
We can now turn to the question under which circumstances analytic models are synthetic models
and when analysis is anti-synthesis. The answer to this is summarized in the following theorem.
THEOREM 1: Given a nontrivial analytic model MF aMa(S) with the cardinality of S greater than 3, then MF
is always a synthetic model, but analysis and synthesis are not inverse.
Proof. Let us first show the second statement is true. Assume it is false, that is, for some systems S
analysis and synthesis are inverse. This statement is false, as Proposition 9 together with Proposi-
tion 7 provides counterexamples: If two models M f, Mg aMa(S ) are totally incompatible, then S
cannot be split into complementary parts as required in Definition 7.
For the first part of the theorem, consider as an example a model MF that partitions S into five
equivalence classes {X1, X2, X3, X4, X5}. In order to show that the theorem holds in this particular
case, we need to find functions f¯1, f¯2 that partition S into two parts as required in Definition 6. There
exist several such pairs of functions. One is as follows:
f¯1 W fX1;X2;X3;X4 [ X5gf¼S2
f¯2 W fX1 [ X2 [ X3;X4;X5gf¼S1
Artificial Life Volume 13, Number 4 9
Computational Realizations of Living SystemsD. Chu and W. K. HoFrom this it is clear that (i) S1 and S2 are disjoint but S ¼ S1 t S2, (ii) MF is the mutual refinement
of M f¯1 and M f¯2, and (iii) f¯2, f¯2 are of the form required for synthetic models (as in Definition 6).
Hence in this particular case MF is a synthetic model.
We will not prove the general case, but point out that the technique applied to this particular
















This theorem shows that the relation between analytic and synthetic models is in general not one of
unconditional equivalence, that is, analysis is not anti-synthesis. For a given finite system S one will be
able to find models MF, M f, Mg such that analysis and synthesis are inverse in the sense defined
above, but there exist no finite systems such that this is always true. This result is not entirely
surprising: Analysis and synthesis are formally very different. Whereas a mutual refinement of two
incompatible models of S gives another model of the system S, the synthesis of two models of S
gives a model of a system SU ¼ S t S, hence of an entirely different system.
Before continuing with the main discussion, it will be necessary to answer to a possible objection
to what is to follow: The notion of mechanisms does not enter anywhere in Section 2. Theorem 1
states that analysis is never anti-synthesis. This might be right, one could object, but Rosen only
claimed analysis and anti-synthesis to be equivalent for mechanisms, not in general. Hence there is
no contradiction between Rosen and Theorem 1.
This is not so. The theorem only assumes that S has more than three but a finite number of
elements. Apart from that, no specific assumptions are made. Mechanisms are certainly a subclass
of finite systems (see Rosen [21]). Hence, the theorem applies in particular to mechanisms. In essence
the theorem is a consequence of the fact that totally incompatible models do not split a system neatly
into two disjoint parts; or inversely, if they do split a system into two parts, then they are not totally
incompatible (see Proposition 9). This conclusion holds whether or not a system is a mechanism.
3.1 Direct Products and Sums
One leitmotif of LI is the equivalence of direct products and direct sums in the realm of mech-
anisms; this is itself just another aspect of the claimed equivalence of analysis and anti-synthesis.
Given the current treatment, the significance of this claim is hard to see.
Analytic models can be associated with direct products in two different ways: Firstly, the operation
of mutual refinement of models Mf, Mg is essentially the process of taking the Cartesian product of
two observables f, g to build the new observable F ¼ ( f, g ). The resulting state space of the new model
is the direct product of the state spaces of the two original models. Analytic models are also associated
with direct products in a category theoretic sense:Ma(S ) is a partially ordered set and thus a category
(see [18, 13]). This means that the model MF can be interpreted as the direct product of Mf and Mg;
see Chu and Ho [7] for an explanation. Similarly, the setMs(S ) is also partially ordered. This order can
be defined in such a way that the synthesis of two models Mf and Mg is their direct sum (see [7]).
This association of analytic (synthetic) models with direct products (sums) is however not as clear
as it seems at a first glance. Firstly, while it is true that the state space of MF ¼ M f 
 Mg is the
Cartesian product of the state spaces of M f and Mg, it is similarly true that the state space of MF ¼
M f1 P M f2 is the Cartesian product of the state spaces of M f1 and M f2. Secondly, whether or not MF
is the direct product or the direct sum of models M f, Mg (in a categorical sense) entirely depends on
the interpretation of the partial order relation in terms of categorical maps, that is, whether MF V
MG is interpreted as MF i MG or MG i MF. The two choices lead to dual categories; what is a
direct product in one category is a direct sum in the other. In this sense, whether or not analytic
models are associated with the direct product or the direct sum is a question of choice, not a
fundamental property of the system. The same is true for the poset of synthetic models.Artificial Life Volume 13, Number 410
Figure 2. Rosen’s (‘‘relational’’) model of a Turing machine. The vertex f denotes the hardware that induces a software
flow from input (A) to output (B). Based on Figure 9B.3 in LI.














Finally, even if one decided for one or the other reason to associate analytic and synthetic models
with direct products and sums respectively, then their identity in the realm of mechanisms would still not
hold (this is again a consequence of the above theorem). In summary, the significance of direct products
and sums in the current context is hard to see and, most of all, not grounded in any mathematical fact.
3.2 Models of Machines and Mechanism
Rosen’s argument crucially rests on the notion of analytic model. This notion can be objected to on
several grounds. A detailed discussion and criticism, particularly of the philosophical underpinnings
of analytic models, would go beyond the scope of the present contribution. We will thus only briefly
indicate that the notion of analytic model is not consistently used by Rosen; this inconsistency will
turn out to be relevant for the validity of Rosen’s central theorem.
One of Rosen’s basic assumptions is that (at least) every mechanism has a unique maximal (analytic)
model. However, in what follows we will suggest that this is not the case, that is, analytic models in Rosen’s
sense encode nearly nothing about a concrete system. In particular, even in the realm of mechanisms,
relational models of systems are not always recoverable from the largest analytic model of a system.
The difficulty for the analysis of relation models and how they relate to analytic models is that
Rosen’s own discussion leaves the notion of relation model somewhat unclear. In this particular case
that turns out not to be a problem. This is best illustrated using one of Rosen’s examples of a
relational model of a Turing machine (TM) as reproduced in Figure 2. While the precise meanings of
the nodes and arrows of this relational model is left unexplained in LI, f seems to represent the
reading head of the TM. The nodes A and B are input and output software configurations; the
transition from A to B is effectuated by the reading head f. A detailed justification and explanation of
this relational model is both outside the scope of this article (and in fact, there are arguments that it is
invalid as a model [23]) and unnecessary for what follows. For the sake of the argument, let us simply
assume that Figure 2 is indeed a model of a TM as suggested by Rosen.
According to Rosen, any TM is a member of the class of mechanisms, and thus there exists a
largest model MF of the TM capturing everything knowable (see quotation above); in particular it
contains all the information that is contained in the relational model. Hence, the relational model
should be recoverable from the largest analytic model. In what follows we will show that this is not
so, thus suggesting that either the notion of relational modeling is meaningless or the largest analytic
model does not encode all information about the TM.
We will assume that the TM is implemented in a n 	 n cellular automaton (CA) c where each
cell has k states (see for example Wolfram [24]). The CA c is certainly also a mechanisms; hence
according to Rosen we are entitled to assume that there exists a (unique) largest model of c, namely,
F : c i f1; 2;:::; kgn2 ð1Þ
This model encodes everything there is to know about c, and hence specifically it should also encode
the relational model of Figure 2.
Let us now assume that there is a second automaton c V that is identical to c in all aspects except
in its initial state configuration. Assume, for example, that every cell of c V takes a random initial state.Artificial Life Volume 13, Number 4 11














In nearly all configurations c V will then not implement a TM. On the other hand, if the model in
Equation 1 is a model of c, then it is also a model of c V. This must be the case because the only
difference between c and c V is that they start from different initial conditions; these however do not
enter into the relational model. At the same time c V does not implement a TM and is thus not
modeled by a relational model as in Figure 2.
These observations allow for two possible conclusions: (i) If MF is indeed a complete model of
c and c V, then the relational model in Figure 2 is not a model of the TM, because it is not recoverable
from MF; it cannot be recoverable, because MF is also a complete model of c V that is not modeled by
the relational model. (ii) If on the other hand Figure 1 is a model of the TM, then there are aspects
of the TM that are not captured by MF, that is, there exists no largest analytic model of the TM.
3.3 Rejecting Rosen’s Central Argument
We are now in the position to reexamine the validity of Rosen’s central proof that living systems are
fundamentally different from mechanisms and machines. For the current purpose it will be sufficient
to reproduce an outline of Rosen’s proof; the reader who is not familiar with the material is en-
couraged to consult LI [21, Chap. 9]. The main structure of the proof is as follows:
1. Assumption: R is a minimal relational model capturing essential properties of a living system S
(closure with respect to efficient causation). S is a mechanism.
2. Premise: If S is a mechanism (or machine), then it is fractionable, that is, analysis and
anti-synthesis are equivalent.
3. Premise: If S is a mechanism (or machine), then there exists a largest model that contains all
information about R.
4. Rosen shows that assumption 1 and premises 2 and 3 are not consistent, that is, if S is
fractionable and R is a model of S, then there exists no largest model of S that captures R.
5. Conclusion: S is not a mechanism.
The reader who has followed so far will immediately see that premises 2 and 3 are invalid. Premise 2
is contradicted by Theorem 1; premise 3 is contradicted by the conclusion of Section 3.2 stating that
at least some machines have no largest model that contains all the information about their relational
models.2 Thus showing that R does not have a largest analytic model does not tell us anything about
the relation between organisms and mechanisms.
4 Conclusion and Outlook
Altogether this is a strong indication that the proof of Rosen’s theorem needs to be rethought before
it can be accepted as correct. Despite serious doubts about the correctness of the proof of the central
theorem, we believe that Rosen’s research program is a worthwhile one to pursue. Probably one of
the more important aspects of Rosen’s legacy is the notion of closure with respect to efficient
causation. The idea is that organisms continuously build components that themselves are necessary to
build other components. This chain of component-building components is closed in such a way that
the structure as a whole can function autonomously (in this context see Letelier and coworkers [14]).
There are arguments that such a closed system is difficult to achieve in computational systems [8].
Are mechanisms fundamentally different to living systems? Is computational artificial life possible?
These questions are certainly still open. Rosen’s central theorem might be correct, but as it stands now
it is unproven. We think that the next step should be to find a novel mathematical ansatz for a
modeling framework of both life and mechanisms to provide new insights into the organizational2 The alternative conclusion (i) of Section 3.2 is that Rosen himself failed to understand his own concept of relational model.
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Computational Realizations of Living SystemsD. Chu and W. K. Hofeatures of life, thus also clarifying the relation between living systems and mechanisms. In particular,
we believe that attempting to salvage Rosen’s proofs is perhaps not worthwhile, although his intentions
and aims will certainly continue to inspire research in theoretical biology and artificial life.
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